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The risk of investment in schooling has largely been ignored. We assess the variance in the 
rate of return by surveying the international empirical literature from this fresh perspective 
and by simulating risky earnings profiles in alternative options, choosing parameters on basis 
of the very limited evidence. The distribution of rates of return appears positively skewed. 
Our best guess of ex ante risk in university education is a coefficient of variation of about 0.3, 
comparable to that in a randomly selected financial portfolio with some 30 stocks. Allowing 
for stochastic components in earnings also markedly affects expected returns. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A remarkable flaw in the analysis of the investment in human capital is the failure to account 
for risk. When deciding on (additional) schooling an individual will not only be interested in the 
expected returns but also in the corresponding risk. In fact, the perceived risk of the 
investment may well be a dominant concern in the decision making process.  
 
In  terms of ex ante risk, the first risk is that on educational performance: how well will the 
individual do in school. This depends on abilities, only partly known when entering school, on 
effort (which may also be imperfectly anticipated) and on the match between curriculum and 
individual. With hurdles like final exams and thresholds for passing on to the next class, an 
individual may not even finish the school she entered. All these factors may be summarized 
as uncertainty as to where in the educational performance distribution the individual will end 
up. As performance in school is not the same as performance in the labor market, the second 
source of risk is uncertainty about the relative position in the post-school earnings distribution. 
A third source of risk is market risk. The value of an education, or associated occupation, may 
shift over time in response to changes in technology, product demand patterns or relative 
supply.      
 
Surprisingly little is known empirically about the dispersion in returns  to education. Even 
though heterogeneity among individuals and hence in their returns has been stressed in 
several contributions, such as Willis and Rosen (1979) and Card (1995), this has not led to a 
focus on the risk associated with human capital investment. We search the empirical literature 
for information on the variation in rates of return, to get some feel for the universe from which 
returns may be drawn. To assess ex ante risk, we design a simulation model to mimic the 
situation facing an individual about to decide on investment in education. This model is simply 
the basic human capital investment model that compares two future earnings streams. 
   3 
Ex post variability in returns is not the same as ex ante risk. Selectivity, extensively highlighted 
in the recent literature, is an important cause of deviations. It’s also an interesting question to 
what extent heterogeneity coincides with risk for the individual investor. If the individuals 
themselves are imperfectly informed on their abilities, future effo rts, job opportunities etc, 
heterogeneity comes close to ex ante risk. The distinction between heterogeneity and risk is 
not relevant for the structure of our simulation model, as it can accommodate both foreseeable 
heterogeneity (variation between individuals) and risk. The distinction is mostly relevant when 
it comes to selecting the parameter values in the simulations. We take key parameters from a 
survey of the empirical literature, without paying much attention to this distinction.  
 
As the relation between risk and return is at the heart of financial investment theory, we may 
turn to that literature for some benchmark information. In a widely used textbook on finance, 
Bodie, Kane and Marcus (1999) refer to Fisher and Lorie (1970) who give an overview o f 
returns to portfolio’s on the New York Stock Exchange. They calculated one-year mean 
returns and standard deviations for randomly selected portfolios differing in size. All portfolios 
had a mean return of 28.2%. But with the portfolio size increasing from 1 to 8 and then further 
to 32 and 128, increasing diversification led to a drop in the coefficient of variation, from 1.45 
through 0.51 and 0.25 to 0.12. The results by Fisher and Lorie are an interesting reference, to 
infer whether schooling is like a s ingle asset (just school years) or more like a portfolio with 
several skills; we will return to this in the concluding section. First, in section 2, we survey the 
literature for ex -post variation in the rate of return, and in section 3 we simulate to assess ex-
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2. Ex Post Variability in Returns to Education: Scanning the Literature 
2. 1. Earnings Dispersion by Education and Experience 
 
Earnings distributions by education can tell us whether schooling moves individuals to 
distributions with different variances. If individuals cannot condition these distributions on 
variables they know when considering entering an education, the distributions provide a crude 
indication of differences in risk. One may differentiate by age or experience, to consider 
different risk profiles over the career. One may either consider the distribution of earnings 
itself or consider residuals from an earnings function, conditioning on an imposed structure of 
returns to schooling and age/experience. Some authors have analyzed the former, some the 
latter and we will just report their outcomes.  
 
Our present limited survey reveals that there is no unequivocal pattern of earnings dispersion 
by education level or by experience (Table 1). There are very few robust “stylized facts”, and 
earnings variance apparently may increase, decrease or have no relation at all with education 
or experience. Clearly, there is scope for basic descriptive work to check the robustness of 
this conclusion.
1 Differences in patterns between countries might point to very different effects 
of education systems, through differences in school admission rules and curriculum structures 
(e.g. broad versus specialized educations).    
 
 
2. 2.  Variation in Mincer coefficients across time and place  
 
The project PURE (Harmon, Walker and Westergaard-Nielsen 2001) generated private 
returns to education across Europe from a standard Mincer earnings equation. Minimum rates 
over the sample period varied between countries from 4.0 to 10.7, maximum rates between 
6.2 and 11.5 percent (see Table 2). Trostel, Walker and Woolley (2002) use data for 28 
countries covering the period 1985-1995, from a common questionnaire applied in all 
                                                   
1 We are working on a standardized international comparison, using the LIS data set.   5 
countries. Averaged over the 28 separate country estimates, the mean return is 5.8% for men, 
with an unweighted standard deviation of 3.5%. For women, the mean return is 6.8%, with 
standard deviation 3.9%.  
 
Ashenfelter et al (1999) performed a meta-analysis to 96 estimated returns obtained from 27 
studies covering 9 countries. The mean return was 7.9% with a standard deviation of 3.6%. 
Regressing these returns on controls like region (within a country), time, ability, estimation 
method, left an intercept of 3% with a standard deviation of 1.6%. 
 
Repeated estimates of Mincer equations over time, within a country, can provide some 
indication of the risk that is associated with shifting market value of schooling, as a 
consequence of changes in supply and demand conditions. In Holland (Hartog et al. 1993) the 
return to human capital has fallen steadily from 13% in 1962 to 7% in 1985 and then has risen 
slightly until 1989. Dutch experience differs from that of US, UK and Australia where the return 
to human capital increased during the eighties. In the U.S., Welch (see Willis, 1991) found that 
the rate of return to college education stayed within a narrow range of 8 to 9 percent from 
1967 to 1981 and rose to little over 10.2 percent in 1982. Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003) 
find a modest variation of Mincer returns for white men between 1940 and 1990 (between 
10.2 and 12.9 percent); for black men, the variation is larger, with the return increasing from 
8.7 percent in 1940 to 15.2 in 1990.    
 
The project PURE (o.c.) finds that in Austria and Sweden, the rates of return decreased by 
about three percent points, whereas in Denmark, Netherlands, Portugal, UK, Ireland and Italy 
returns are upward trended  (Table 2). The returns in Germany, France, Norway, Finland, 
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2.3. Variation in Mincer coefficients across individuals 
 
Harmon, Hogan and Walker (2003) treat the return to education on a sample of U.K data as a 
random coefficient. They specify earnings for individual i as: 
 
( ) i i i i i X s w h g e b + + + = ln  
 
where X  is a vector of explanatory variables (including age) and  h is the residual, with 
standard deviation s. This is a heteroscedastic model, with error variance  
 
2 2 2 2 ] ) [( s q h e + = + i i i i s s E  
 
Harmon et al. find an estimated mean return of 4% for men and 7% for women, with 
dispersions of 4% and 3.3%. 95% of the men have returns in the +/- 7.8% interval around the 
mean, 95 % of the women are in the +/- 6.5% around their mean. Thus the dispersion is large 
even after allowing for several observable individual characteristics, and some individuals 
even have negative returns. The results by Harmon et al for the UK and two studies they cite 
(Finland and the USA) all have coefficients of variation in the range 0.4 to 0.6. This exactly 
coincides with the values found by Ashenfelter et al (1999) when they allow for heterogeneous 
returns.   
 
Pereira and Martins (2001) measure risk as the difference in returns between the ninth and 
the first decile from a quantile regression estimation of the Mincer equation. Across 16 
countries the risk lies between –1.95% and 8.9%, at an average unweighted OLS return of 7.8 
percent. Note that in a normal distribution, the difference between the value at P(90) and   7 
P(10) would cover 2.56 standard deviations. The risk measure would then indicate a standard 
deviation between 0.76 and 3.47 percent.
2    
 
 
2.4. What have we learned?  
 
We did not find robust stylized facts on the relation between earnings dispersion and 
education or experience (age). This suggests that the education systems in different countries 
function quite differently in segmenting the labour force. If individuals cannot perfectly predict 
their position in post-school earnings distributions, this suggests that the risk in educational 
investment varies across countries.      
 
The Mincerian rate of return in one country may easily be 2 to 3 times the returns in another 
country. Across countries, the coefficient of variation may be something like 0.5. Within 
countries, there is generally a fair amount of stability over several decades. The large changes 
in The Netherlands and for Black men in the US seem exceptional. Over time, within countries 
the differences between the minimum and the maximum rate seem generally perhaps no 
more than a third of the minimum rate.  
 
On differences in returns between individuals there is even less information. Available studies 




                                                   
2 Pereira and Martins use their estimates to test for compensation of earnings risk in wages.  A few 
other studies have also found risk compensation in wages (Hartog et al, 2003; Hartog and Vijverberg 
2002, and the references cited there).   8 
3. Assessing risk 
3.1 Analytical solutions  
 
By definition, the internal rate of return to education is the rate of discount, d, that equates the 
present values of lifetime earnings for two different educational levels, s0 and s1, i. e., the 
interest rate that solves the equation: 
 




















The earnings functions are f(s0, (t-s0)) and  f(s1, (t-s1)),  with s0, s1  years of schooling and with 
t-s0,  t-s1  years of work experience.  T0  and  T1 are the durations of the working life after 
graduation. Note that this is a quite general framework, though not without limitations. We 
compare two investments, of different lengths, with a binding commitment up front. This might 
apply to different types of education, possibly but not necessarily differing in length (e.g a 3 
year education in economics or a 4 year education in law). It can be reduced to the basic 
Mincer m odel by setting  so=0 and  s1 at the relevant value for a particular education (high 
school, university), or at s1=1 to study marginal investments. But it excludes the option value 
of education, a worthy target for future work. .  
 
Let us start simply by computing the internal rate of return to s1 rather than  s0 years of 
schooling, for an infinitely lived individual (T= ¥), with potential earnings functions that include 
independent stochastic components  u0~(0, s0
2),  u1~(0,  s1
2). We assume only one lifetime 
shock. The amount of human capital produced in school is unknown when entering but 
revealed at the predetermined time of leaving and then determines annual earnings for the 
rest of working life. The profiles differ in returns to schooling and to experience. For the 
moment we ignore the usual quadratic term in experience. The internal rate of return then 
follows from:     9 
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Equation ( 4) is a generalization of the Mincer specification. With equal means in shock 
exponentials, identical experience profiles and with minimum level of education zero  (s0=0), 
we obtain  d=b3: the coefficient in the earnings function equals the internal rate of return. 
Generally, in equation ( 4), the internal rate of return is the return for selecting a longer 
education with a different reward per year of schooling and per year of experience. The latter 
feature is routinely neglected. If higher education brings more earnings growth this boosts the 
returns to education
3. Note that b3 measures the average return per school year for s1 years of 
schooling and b1 measures the average return per school year for s0 years of schooling. In 
empirical earnings functions with dummies for different levels of education, average returns for 
longer educations are often lower than for shorter education. This depresses the internal rate 
of return d. 
 
Equation ( 4) has to be solved numerically for d. If s0=0  or  b1=b3,  d will be given by the 
transcendent equation:  
 
                                                   
3 The same point is made by Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1999, p 331). Brunello and Comi (2000) 









+ =   (5)  
 
The effect of differential experience profiles (b2„b4) can be substantial. Suppose, the return to 
school years is 0.065 and the experience growth differs by one percent point: b2=0.05 for s0=0 
and  b4=0.0 6 for  s1=4.  Then the internal rate of return  d=0.160. If  b2=0.01 for  s0=0  and 
b4=0.015 for s1=4 then the internal rate of return d=0.114.  
 
In the more general case with different means of the exponential shocks and correlation r 









































The correlation coefficient does not affect the expected rate of return. With b2=b4 and u 0,  u1  
normally distributed with means and variances m0, s0
2 and m1, s1
2 respectively, the mean of the 
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2, m0=m1, and b1=b3 or s0=0, we have equivalence to the standard Mincer 
world: Ed =b3. If s0
2„s1
2, but the rest of the previous conditions are fulfilled, then the expected 
value of the internal rate of return is affected by the difference in the errors variances. In this 
case, part of the return to education derives from a difference in the stochastic processes. If 
additional schooling gives access to a wider earnings distribution, expected returns go up.  
 
                                                   
4 We approximate E ln (exp x) by ln E (exp x).   11 
We can approximate
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The variance of the rate of return is affected by the sum of the two variances whereas the 
expectation is affected by the difference in the variances. Positive correlation in the shocks 
reduces the variance, negative correlation increases it. With perfectly positively correlated 
shocks and identical variances, the internal rate of return has zero variance: with equal shocks 
for both schooling options, the shocks have become irrelevant.  
 
 
3.2. A framework for simulation  
 
If we add a quadratic experience term, as commonly estimated, and allow for annual shocks 
instead of a single lifetime shock, possibly correlated over time, the solution can no longer be 
derived analytically. We must then resort to numerical solutions. We evoke the flavor of real 
life choices by performing simulations for individuals who may leave s chool after completing 
high school or continue their education in college. The earnings functions are:  
 
t HS HS HS HS HS HS HS t HS u s t s t s w ,
2
, 3 , 2 , 1 , ) ( ) ( ln + - + - + = b b b   (9) 
t C C C C C C C t C u s t s t s w ,
2
, 3 , 2 , 1 , ) ( ) ( ln + - + - + = b b b   (10) 
 
b1,HS, b1,C are the average rates of return to sHS and sC years of schooling respectively. b2,HS, 
b3,HS and b2,C,  b3,C determine the effects of experience and experience squared for an 
individual with sHS and sC years of schooling respectively. The errors follow AR (1) processes 
of the form: 
                                                   
5 We approximate V ln (exp x) by [ln
’E (x)]
2 V(exp x). 
   12 
 
t HS t HS HS t HS u u , 1 , , h g + = -   (11) 
t C t C C t C u u , 1 , , h g + = -   (12) 
 
We suppress the individual subscript as we only deal with the perspective of a single 
individual. We assume that ht,HS  is i.i.d. N(0, sHS
2) and ht,C  is i.i.d. N(0,  sC
2).  We study the 
case when ut,HS and ut,C  are uncorrelated at any  t, as well as the case when  HS t u ,  and 
C t u , ¢ correlate at  C HS, r  for equal experience t=t
’ and at zero otherwise.  
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It may seem that with this specification we only allow for transient shocks during working life 
and not for permanent shocks emanating from effectiveness in school. As in section 3.1, one 
might think of a specification with uncertain effectiveness of schooling reflected in a single 
lifetime shock revealed upon completion of schooling, combined with annual earnings shocks 
(cf. Chen, 2003). However, only the lifetime shock from one schooling level relative to the 
other is relevant. The shocks may be perfectly correlated indicating that the individual would 
do as well in one education as in the other, as in a model with hierarchical ability. Or they may 
be perfectly negatively correlated reflecting perfect comparative advantage: being the best in 
one education would concur with being the worst in the other. The essence of such cases can 
be caught in the correlation between annual innovations h: comparative advantage would be 
reflected in negative correlation and hierarchical ability in positive correlation. Our 
specification can therefore describe the options to a large extent. If  C HS , r =+1 talent is 
something like a general ability that puts an individual in the same performance rank with 
every education he pursues, whereas at  C HS, r =–1 two different educations completely 
reverse the individual’s standing.   
   13 
We consider a working life span T of 40 years, independent of the length of schooling. An 
individual record consists of 40 draws of the disturbance term ut,HS, used to predict earnings 
with sHS years of education for fixed values of bi,HS  (i˛{1,2,3}), and 40 draws of the disturbance 
term  ut,C from an alternative distribution with  sC years of education, added to predicted 
earnings from the associated bi,C  (i˛{1,2,3}) for that education. For such an individual record, 
we solve numerically for the internal rate of return d. This process is repeated 100.000 times, 
with 100.000 new sets of draws for the two earnings profiles. We then calculate mean and 
standard error of d from the 100.000 runs. We repeat this for several sets of parameter values. 
As explained in the Appendix, we rewrote the stochastic specification for easier computation.  
 
 
3.3. Parameter values  
 
In an Appendix we scan the empirical literature for the possible magnitudes of our 
parameters.
6 For the return to a y ear of schooling we assume a rate of 0.065 throughout, 
without alternatives. This implies that our benchmark internal rate of return is 0.065, the rate 
that would result in a Mincer world. For the experience profile we take a linear term of 0.05 
and a quadratic term of -.001 as our reference values. As an alternative, we set the quadratic 
term for high school at -.002, maintaining the college quadratic term at -.001; this means that 
the decline of earnings growth with experience for college education is half the decline for high 
school education.  
 
Our reading of the evidence indicates that residual earnings standard deviations are generally 
between 0.25 and 0.65; we take that as our range of variation, with the basic reference value 
in the middle: 0.45. We allow the residual variance for college earnings to be larger than for 
high school earnings, not smaller. For the persistence term  g we use 0.6 as our preferred 
value; we will allow variation to vary the relative weight of the innovation in the earnings 
                                                   
6 Available on our website: http://www1.fee.uva.nl/scholar/mdw/hartog/main.htm   14 
process. We are fairly confident that these are reasonable values, based upon our reading of 
the empirical literature
7. We are least confident about the correlation across educations, 
simply because there is no empirical evidence to guide us, in spite of all the emphasis it gets 
in the self-selection literature. Willis and Rosen (1979), who started this literature, could not 
identify the correlation. Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2003) provides probably the first 
empirical evidence and their results suggest modest positive correlation for college compared 
to high-school. We opt for 0.5 as our preferred value, but also consider the extremes of –1 
and + 1. We set  sHS=0 and sC=4, thus calculating the return to university education after 
completing high school.   
 
 
3.4. Simulation results 
 
In  Table 3 , we compare our analytical approximations for the simplified case (linear 
experience profile, single lifetime shock) with simulation results. As the table shows, there is a 
very small difference between the approximation of  E(d) from ( 7) and the value found in the 
simulations. The difference results from the finite length of the working life  T in the 
simulations, compared with the assumption of infinite working lifetime in formula ( 7). The 
results bear out that the expected rate of return is sensitive to differences in dispersion 
between alternative educations. E(d) neatly increases in step with the difference between the 
variances. Equation (8) suggests that the dispersion in the rate of return is more sensitive to 
the  level of earnings dispersions than to the difference in the earnings dispersion. This is 
indeed what the simulations also show. However, the approximation in (8), based on a first-
order Taylor expansion appears quite crude, and unreliable to indicate the magnitude of the 
dispersion. 
 
                                                   
7 By taking the parameter values as we found them in the literature, without correction for selectivity or 
heterogeneity, we assume full ignorance on the position in future distributions. If individuals have better 
information, their risk will be reduced. This may be reflected in variances near the low end of the 
intervals , and possibly even lower (as the observed values would be biased).   
   15 
The core results are collected in Table 4. The first row gives the reference case we defined 
above: 0.6 persistence, 0.5 cross-education correlation, and identical residual correlations of 
0.45. Moving from a risk-less world to stochastic earnings profiles increases the expected rate 
of return, from 0.065 to 0.071 in our benchmark parameter set, and generates a standard 
deviation of 0.031, i.e. a coefficient of variation just under 0.5. In Figure 1a, we have graphed 
the entire frequency distribution of 100 000 draws. Interestingly, the distribution is skewed to 
the right, with an elongated upper tail. With individuals generally not only caring for risk but 
also for skewness, this is an interesting observation (cf. Hartog and Vijverberg, 2002). The 
degree of skewness varies with the parameters. In Figure 1b we show the case with the most 
skewed distribution in our parameter set, obtained when we set the coefficient of correlation at 
–1 rather than our reference value of 0.5. 
 
Figur e 1. The distribution of internal rates of return 
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b.r=-1, suHS=suC=0.45, gHS=gC=0.6; b1,HS=b1,C=0.065, b2,HS =b2,C=0.05, b3,HS=b3,C=-0.001 
 
 
As anticipated  in equation ( 4), differences in earnings profiles have a strong effect on 
expected returns. A percentage point difference in the linear term boosts the return by almost 
three percents, cutting the decline in earnings growth for college in half relative to high school 
boosts it by almost four percents, in both cases without noticeable effect on the dispersion.  
 
Increasing the standard deviations in both earnings profiles simultaneously has a smaller 
effect on expected returns than creating a difference between them. If both standard 
deviations increase by 0.20, from 0.45 to 0.65, the expected return increases by 0.008. If 
college standard deviation surpasses high school standard deviation by 0.20, as in the case 
(0.45; 0.25), returns are 0.014 higher than in the standard case. This reflects the conclusion 
from equation (7) that expected returns are sensitive to the difference in variances. Also in line 
with this approximation we see that increasing the base standard deviation (high school) 
reduces the expected return, while increasing the standard deviation in the extended 
education (college) increases the expected return. But the results in the variance panel of 
Table 4 also indicate that the approximation in equation (7), based on linear profiles and 
infinite lives, is too simple. At the same variance difference as in the case (0.45; 0.25), the 
case (0.65; 0.45) generates a much higher expected return, of 0.101 rather than 0.085. This 
brings out an important result: stochastic properties of earnings profiles have a strong impact 
on expected returns. Of course, earnings variances also markedly influence the dispersion of   17 
the rate of return. The variance rule brought out in the approximation of equation (8) holds up 
quite well: the variance of the rate of return  increases in the sum of the variances of the 
earnings profiles. In  Table 4 , the standard deviation of the rate of return increases 
monotonically from 0.014 in the case (0.25; 0.25), at a sum of variances of 0.15, to 0.057 in 
the case (0.65; 0.65), at a sum of 0.85, with the cases of unequal standard deviations 
smoothly fitting in. The effect of the earnings dispersions is quite strong: increasing both 
standard deviations from 0.25 to 0.65 increases the standard deviation of the return more than 
fourfold.      
   
If correlations over time (persistence gI, i˛{HS,C} ) increase jointly, expected returns go up but 
the dispersion increases non-negligibly. This reflects that although the variance of  u is itself 
unaffected (we constrain it to be constant), the conditional variance (conditional on the past 
draw) goes up. If we only vary one of the inter-temporal covariances, the dispersion of the rate 
of return increases in either case.  But the expected return reacts in opposite ways, increasing 
with high school correlation but decreasing with college correlation.  
 
Correlation across educations has a monotonic effect on expected return and dispersion. Both 
decline when the correlation increases from  –1 to +1. But the effect on dispersion is much 
stronger than on expected return. Positive correlation dampens stochastic differences, 
negative correlation widens them. With perfect positive correlation, the standard deviation is 
about half that in our reference case (correlation 0.5), with perfect negative correlation the 
standard deviation is almost double that in the reference case.   
 
Now let’s assess the likely magnitude of risk involved in investing in schooling. In our basic 
Mincer case the internal rate of return is 0.065, with zero dispersion. In what we consider a 
realistic case, college education would give access to steeper experience profile (earnings 
growth slope of –0.001 instead of –0.002), annual shocks would have a dispersion of 0.45 for 
both educations, persistence would be 0.60 in both educations and the shocks would correlate 
at 0.50. This would generate an expected rate of return of 0.110, with standard deviation   18 
0.031 (coefficient of variation 0.28). Hence for the case of college versus high school 
education, we consider a coefficient of variation in the rate of return of about 0.3 our most 
reasonable guess. But given the uncertainty about parameter values, we have to admit a wide 
range of possible outcomes. In our simulations, the standard deviation lies between 0.014 and 
0.084. The lowest value is obtained when the innovations in the earnings have both minimum 
standard deviation (0.25), the highest value is obtained when the persistence in both earnings 
shocks is at the high value of 0.8. In the former case, at the lowest dispersion, the coefficient 





As individuals commonly care not only about the expected return to an investment in 
education, but also about its risk, we have investigated what the magnitude of this risk may 
be. The existing literature does not point to a simple universal relation between earnings 
variance and level of education. To the extent that (residual) earnings variance by education 
reflects an individual’s ex ante ignorance on her post-school position in an earn ings 
distribution, we cannot say whether continued education increases or decreases “ignorance”, 
or risk. Ex post realizations of Mincerian rates of return to education show fairly wide variation 
across countries (up to double or triple in one country relative to another, with coefficient of 
variation of perhaps 0.5), modest variation over time within countries (with a country’s 
maximum generally not more than a third above it’s minimum, in a time series) and coefficient 
of variation across individuals within a country of perhaps 0.5. To the extent that the results 
also reflect individual heterogeneity, and individuals are better informed about their potential, 
individual risk may be smaller than reflected in these ex post realisations.   
 
From our simulations of ex ante risk we conclude that a coefficient of variation of about 0.3 is 
a reasonable guess. Comparing to the NYSE portfolio returns mentioned in the introduction, 
this suggests that investment in a college education is similar to investing in the stock market,   19 
with a portfolio of some 30 randomly selected stocks. The distribution of the internal rate of 
return is skewed to the right, with an elongated upper tail. 
 
The standard deviation of the rate of return is quite sensitive to the sum of the variances of the 
alternative earnings profiles and to the correlation in the shocks. If the standard deviations in 
the earnings innovations increase from their joint low of 0.25 to their joint high of 0.65, the 
standard deviation of the rate of return increases fourfold. If the correlation increases from –1 
to +1, the standard deviation increases more than threefold.  
 
Unintentionally, we have found substantial effects on the expected rate of return. Differences 
in earnings growth rates for different educations  can easily bring an extra 4 percent return. 
While obvious, this effect is routinely overlooked. Less obvious, just introducing stochastic 
components in earnings profiles has a marked effect on the expected rate of return. When in 
the risk-less Mincer world the rate of return would be 0.065, in our reference case it has an 
expected value of 0.071. With increasing differences in shock distributions between the 
alternatives, the difference can easily increase to several percentage points.  
 
We conclude that indeed investment in human capital carries a substantial risk and therefore, 
risk aspects in human capital are worthy of further research. Since we also know that 
individuals are generally risk-averse, in different degrees (Hartog, Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
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 Appendix. The simulation procedure 
 
  Our simulation problem is stated for certain values of the variance in errors: 
C HS u u s s   , , 
correlation between errors:  C HS, r ,  and inter-temporal correlations: 
C HS g g   ,   . Therefore, firstly 
we set the values of these parameters in a vector  )   ,   ,   ,   , ( , C HS C HS u u C HS p g g r s s = . 
  Given this targeted structure, we construct the errors uHS,t and uc,t, t from 0 to 40,  as  
follows: 
-at time t=0: 
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 ,   , C C HS HS u u h h = =  
 where  0 , 0 ,   , C HS h h  independent and normally distributed  ) , 0 (
2
HS u N s and ) , 0 (
2
C u N s ,  
respectively.  
-at time t, 1£ t £40, 
) ( , 1 , , I u u t HS t HS HS t HS h g + = -  
) ( , 1 , , II u u t C t C C t C h g + = -  
where the innovations  t C t HS , ,   ,h h  are independent, normally distributed N(0,sHS
2) and N(0,sC
2)  
respectively. The variances of the innovations are obtained from 
2 2 2 ) 1 (
HS u HS HS s g s - =   and 
2 2 2 ) 1 (
C u C C s g s - = . The correlation between the errors  uHS,t and uc,t can be set by controlling 
the correlation between the innovations  t C t HS , ,   ,h h . In order to do this, the innovations are 
generated using four scalars l1, l2, l3, l 4, and three independent random variables e1, t , e2, t , 
e3,t, normally distributed  ) , 0 (
2
i N e s ,  3 , 1 = i , such that:  
hHS,t=l1e1, t+l2e2,t  (III) 
hC,t=l3e2, t+l4e3,t  (IV) 
Taking variances in (I), (II), (III), and (IV) we write the equations system (we dropped the time 
subscripts): 







+ + ” + =
+ + ” + =
2


















s l l s s r g g s s r
s l s l s g s s g s
s l s l s g s s g s
C HS C HS
C C C C
HS HS HS HS
u u C HS C HS u u C HS
u C u C u
u HS u HS u
V  
where the correlation in innovations, let us denote it   ) , ( C HS h h r , satisfies 
2
3 2 2 ) , ( e s l l s s h h r = C HS C HS . 
With the parameters initially set in the vector  ( ) C HS C HS u u C HS p g g r s s   ,   ,   ,   , , = , we want to find 
the values for  { } { } 4 , 3 , 2 , 1   ,   , 3 , 2 , 1   , ˛ ˛ j i j i l s e  that satisfy the constraints in equations system 
(V).  
Hence, we have to solve an over-determined equations system that has three equations and 
seven unknowns 
3 2 1 , , , , , , 4 3 2 1 e e e s s s l l l l             . We have to set the four freedom degrees 
(for instance 





















Table 1. Earnings dispersion by education and experience (age) 
Author  Country and 
Sample 





Education  Experience 
Becker  U.S. college & 
high-school 
1939, 1949  c.v.  +  n.a. 
Weiss  U.S. scientists  1972  c.v.  -  ¨ 
Hartog  Netherlands  1962, 1965, 1972  c.v.  ˙  + 
Chen  U.S. college & 
high-school 
1979-1998  c.v.  +  n.a. 
Mincer   U.S.  1960  s(lny)  n.a.  0 
Dooley & 
Gottschalk 
U.S.  1968-1979  s(lny)  -  ¨ 
Hartog et al.  Netherlands  1962, 1965, 1972, 
1979, 1985, 1989 
s(lny)  +  0 
Polachek  U.S.  1980, 1990  s(lny)  +  ¨ 
Polachek  LIS countries  1990  s(lny)  0  ¨ 
Belzil & 
Hansen 
U.S.  1979  s(lny)  -  n.a. 
Notes: lny log wages; c.v. coefficient of variation;  ¨  U -shape; ˙ inverse-U-shape; +/- positive /negative effect;  




Table 2.  Variation in national rates of return over time 
Country   Minimum Rate of Return 
to years of schooling and 
the cor responding year 
Trend  Maximum Rate of Return to 
years of schooling and the 
corresponding year 
Gap 
Austria  0.074 (1997)  ﬂ  0.103 (1981)  0.029 
Sweden  0.040 (1991)  ﬂ  0.075 (1968)  0.035 
Denmark  0.044 (1982)  ›  0.061 (1995)  0.017 
Ireland  0.097 (1987)  ›  0.115 (1995)  0.018 
Italy  0.039 (1981)  ›  0.062 (1995)  0.023 
Netherlands  0.058 (1986)  ›  0.063 (1996)  0.005 
Portugal  0.107 (1982)  ›  0.109 (1995)  0.002 
U.K.  0.049 (1980)  ›  0.065 (1995)  0.016 

















Table 3. Internal Rate of Ret urn: Analytical and Simulated Solutions for the Linear 
Profile: b 1,HS =b1,C=0.065, b2,HS =b2,C=0.050, b3,HS =b3,C=0.00 
gHS  gC  sHS   sC  r HS,C  Ed (eq (7))  E(d) sim.  s(d) (eq (8))  s(d) sim. 
0.0  0.0  0.25  0.25  0.0  0.065  0.065  0.009  0.008 
0.0  0.0  0.45  0.45  0.0  0.065  0.066  0.046  0.019 
0.0  0.0  0.65  0.65  0.0  0.065  0.068  0.050  0.040 
0.0  0.0  0.25  0.65  0.0  0.110  0.113  0.063  0.032 
0.0  0.0  0.35  0.55  0.0  0.087  0.090  0.050  0.024 
0.0  0.0  0.35  0.45  0.0  0.075  0.072  0.033  0.020 
0.6  0.6  0.45  0.45  0.5  0.065  0.066  0.031  0.015 
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Table 4. Simulation Results 
b1,C  b 2,C  b3,C  b1,HS  b2,HS  b 3,HS 
C u s  
HS u s   gC  gHS  rHS,C  E(d)  s(d) 
Reference case 
0.065  0.05  -0.001  0.065  0.05  -0.001  0.45  0.45  0.6  0.6  0.50  0.071  0.031 
Experience Slopes 
          -0.002            0.110  0.031 
        0.04              0.099  0.033 
Variances 
            0.25  0.25        0.067  0.014 
            0.35  0.35        0.069  0.022 
            0.55  0.55        0.075  0.043 
            0.65  0.65        0.079  0.057 
            0.45  0.25        0.085  0.028 
            0.45  0.35        0.079  0.029 
            0.55  0.45        0.085  0.040 
            0.65  0.45        0.101  0.051 
Persistence over Time  
                0.0  0.0    0.067  0.016 
                0.2  0.2    0.068  0.020 
                0.4  0.4    0.069  0.025 
                0.8  0.8    0.074  0.084 
                0.0  0.2    0.068  0.018 
                0.0  0.4    0.069  0.021 
                0.0  0.8    0.078  0.035 
                0.2  0.0    0.067  0.018 
                0.4  0.0    0.067  0.020 
                0.8  0.0    0.063  0.024 
Correlation in Alternati ves 
                    -1.00  0.081  0.056 
                    -0.75  0.080  0.054 
                    -0.50  0.078  0.050 
                    -0.25  0.077  0.046 
                    -0.10  0.076  0.044 
                    0.00  0.075  0.042 
                    +0.10  0.074  0.040 
                    +0.25  0.073  0.037 
                    +0.75  0.069  0.024 
                    +1.00  0.068  0.017 
Note: parameters have the reference value stated in the top row, unless a different value is stated. 
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